darryl mitchell
2010-02-10 00:23:21 UTC
S.V. Khristenko, All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (AUCPB)
(Translated by Kevin Cain, leader of For Bolshevism-AUCPB in the UK)
THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVISATION
Already by the end of 1927, the decisive success of the policy of
socialist industrialization was ascertained. In the sphere of industry,
the question "who is who" was a foregone conclusion in favour of
socialism. A different picture was presented by agriculture. Gross
output of its main sectors - grain production - amounted to only 91% of
the pre-war level, and the commodity side of grain products sold for
the supply of towns, barely reached 37% of the pre-war level, and all
evidence suggests that there was a danger of further decline of
commodity grain production. No doubt that if such a condition continued
in grain farming, the country would have found itself in the face of
chronic hunger.
The owner of the grain market was the kulak (wealthy peasant farmer).
Making up 2.5 -3% of the total number of farms, kulaks harvested 70-80%
of commodity grain. Poor farmers, who were horseless, were in complete
bondage to the kulak. For the use of a horse, a poor peasant had to
pay "either a pood of grain per day, or a woman harvesting for five
days." They were crippling terms, but what could they do? The harvest
of the poor peasant was not enough to last until the next year, and so
he had to borrow grain from the kulaks to the next harvest. He had to
return twice the amount of grain! The kulaks demanded from the state
complete freedom of trade in grain. The state price for grain did not
suit the kulak â so the kulak decided â âI will not sell the grain, but
will dig it into a pit, and let it rot. And it was a mass phenomenon.
For concealment of grain in 1928, for example, in the Middle Volga
Region, 17 thousand kulak farms were put on trial.
WAYS OUT OF THE CRISIS
To get out of the crisis situation, it was necessary to transfer
agriculture over to large-scale production that can set in motion,
tractors and agricultural machinery and to raise several times the
marketability of grain production. The country faced two options:
either to move to large-scale capitalist production, which would mean
the ruin of the peasant masses, the loss of alliance between the
working class and peasants, a strengthening of the kulaks and the
defeat of socialism in the countryside, or take the path of
consolidation of small farms into large socialist farms, i.e.
collective farms.
It is clear that the Bolshevik Party and Soviet state could only take
the second road, the collective farm pathway of agricultural
development. This is what Lenin said: "Only if we succeed in practice
to show peasants the benefits of public, collective, cooperative
cultivation, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of a
cooperative, collective farm economy, will the working class, which
holds state power in its own hands, and the peasants actually prove
their case, and really attract over to its side firmly in this way,
millions of peasants.
XV CONGRESS. COLLECTIVIZATION. THE KULAK.
Such was the situation before the XV Congress of the Party opened on
December 2, 1927. Noting in his Report to Congress on the progress of
industrialization and the rapid growth of socialist industry, Stalin
put to the Party the task: "To expand and strengthen our socialist
commanding heights in all sectors of the economy both in the city and
village, heading towards the liquidation of capitalist elements in the
national economy. Noting the backwardness of agriculture, especially
grain production, comrade Stalin emphasized that such an unenviable
state of agriculture was posing a threat to the entire economy.
"The way out, - answered comrade Stalin â is to turn the small and
scattered peasant farms into large integrated ones based on social
cultivation of land, in the transition to collective farming on the
basis of new and higher technology. The way out is for the small and
tiny peasant farms to gradually but steadily, not by pressure, but by
example and persuasion, merge into large farms based on public,
cooperative, collective farming, with the use of agricultural machinery
and tractors, using scientific methods of intensive farming.â
The XV Congress decided on the full deployment of collectivization of
agriculture. The Congress adopted a plan for expanding and
strengthening the network of collective and state farms, and gave clear
instructions on how to fight for collectivization of agriculture. The
Party realized that, until the resistance of the kulaks was broken, and
until kulakism was smashed in open battle in front of the peasantry,
the working class and the Red Army will suffer from a shortage of
bread, and the collective movement of peasants can not take a mass
character.
Following the directives of the XV Congress of the Party, the party
launched a determined offensive against the kulaks. In its advance
forward, the party carried the slogan: reliance on the poor peasant and
strengthening the alliance with the middle peasant, carry out a
resolute struggle against the kulaks. In response to the refusal by the
kulaks to sell surplus grain to the state at a fixed price, the party
and the government carried out a series of emergency measures against
the kulaks, applied Article 107 of the Criminal Code on confiscation by
the court of surplus grain from the kulaks and speculators if they
refuse to sell this surplus grain to the state at fixed prices.
KULAK TERROR
The kulaks immediately realized the mortal danger to themselves by
collectivization and unleashed terror against the collective farm
activists and village correspondents. Not a week went by that the
newspapers did not report killings of village correspondents carried
out by kulaks. In the village of Molvino in Bogorodsky district, of the
Moscow province, an active rural correspondent of the county
newspaper "Voice of the working" and secretary Zakharov of the Komsomol
cell were shot and killed from behind a corner. In the village of Sabah
(Tatar Republic), kulaks brutally murdered active worker rural
correspondent Zakir Yusupov, who was exposing the tricks of the kulaks
in the newspapers. In Crimea, in the village Mushasha, kulaks killed
labourer-Komsomol Alexeyev, an organizer of the rural wall newspaper.
In Uzbekistan, Bai mercenaries slaughtered active worker comrade
Shukurov and his wife. The Orshansky district court sentenced to five
years in prison four kulaks from the village Lozovka in Krupsky
district for arson of the new farm "Iskra" and the destruction of nine
collective farm workers. Of interest are available a summary of
information of the hostile acts carried out against the collective
farms in the first half of 1931. In general, across the Soviet Union
during this period were attacked once - 8.1% percent of collective
farms, two times - 3.4%, three times - 1.4%, four times or more - 2.9%
of farms. Out of one hundred cases of attack, 21.9% were arson attacks,
poisoning of cattle - 7.4%, attacks on activists - 35.1% of cases,
damage to the collective farm machinery â 14.5% and others - 20.7% of
cases.
TURNING TO COLLECTIVE FARMS
The actual attitude by the mass of the peasants - poor, middle peasants
toward collectivization after the XV Congress of the Party had changed.
The peasant masses were definitely turning towards collective farms. An
important role was played by state and Machine-Tractor Stations, armed
with tractors and other machines. Creating MTS-s was fully supported by
Stalin in his speech at the XV Congress, where he quoted a letter from
Odessa peasants: "After seeing the work of the tractors, we do not want
poor small-scale farming, and have decided to organize a tractorized
socialized economy in which there will be none of the peasant patches
of crops. The organizing of tractor farms for us has already been taken
on by the Taras Shevchenko farm, with whom we made agreementâ. On June
5, 1929, the Labor and Defense Council adopted a resolution on the
widespread establishment of MTS-s. It was a wise decision, which made
it possible to unload from the emerging collective farms the unbearable
burden of buying expensive agricultural technology, by providing for
high-quality maintenance and repair. The role of the MTS in raising the
level of Soviet agriculture was enormous. MTS-s lasted until 1958, when
Khrushchev had them liquidated. As has been written on the
Internet: "At the present time, due to the difficult financial
situation of many agricultural enterprises, as well as the development
of small farms, the need to form MTS-s has re-emerged!â
A country rhyme during the time of collectivization clearly shows the
position of poor peasants:
You kulak -
Enemy of the Soviet,
Who buries bread in the ravine, -
You will not bring back the days bygone,
Shall not lead the country to darkness.
A mass collective-farm movement unfolded, which especially gained
strength by the end of 1929, and gave unprecedented growth of the
collective farms. In 1928, the sown area of farms was 1,390 thousand
hectares in 1929 - 4,262 thousand hectares, and in 1930 the collective
farms had sown 15 million hectares. In his article "A Year of Great
Change" (November 7, 1929) Comrade Stalin said, "It must be admitted
that the rate of growth of the collective farms - is such speedy pace
of development unprecedented even by our socialized large-scale
industry, the pace of development is altogether on a grander scale." It
was a turning point in the development of the collective movement. This
was the beginning of a mass collective-farm movement. "What is new in
the current collective-farm movement?", asked Comrade. Stalin. And he
answered: "The new and decisive in the current collective-farm movement
is that the collective peasants are not in separate groups, as was the
case earlier, but entire villages, parishes, districts, and even
okrugs. And what does this mean? This means that the middle peasant has
gone into collective farms. This is the basis of that radical change in
the development of agriculture, which is a major achievement of Soviet
power ...â.
This meant that the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class, on the
basis of complete collectivisation was ripening or had ripened. The
massive entry of peasants into collective farms that unfolded in 1929 -
1930 respectively, was the result of all the previous work of the Party
and government. The growth of socialist industry, which began mass
production of tractors and agricultural machinery; the resolute
struggle against the kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns in
1928 and 1929; a good experience of the first collective and state
farms - all this prepared for the transition to solid collectivization,
the entry of peasants into collective farms of whole villages, regions,
districts.
ELIMINATION OF KULAKS AS A CLASS.
Until 1929 the Soviet government pursued a policy of restricting the
kulaks. Soviet power heavily taxed the kulaks, demanded that he sell
grain to the state at fixed prices, limited to a certain size the
kulak's land use by the law on land lease and limited the scope of
kulak farming by a law on the use of hired labor on private farms.
At the end of 1929, in connection with the growth of collective and
state farms, the Soviet government made a sharp turn in relation to the
kulak. On January 19, 1930, Stalin wrote an article "On the question of
eliminating the kulaks as a class," which clearly and unequivocally
said: "The current policy of the party in the countryside is not a
continuation of the old policy, but a change from the old policy of
restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the village to a
new policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. "
This policy was embodied in the decree of the Central Committee of the
CPSU (b) on January 5, 1930 "On the speed of collectivization and
measures by the state to help farm development" . The decision made
important instructions that the main form of farm movement at this
stage was the agricultural cooperative, in which only the basic means
of production was collectivized. The Central Committee seriously warned
against any party organizations whatsoever, "decreeing" from above and
over the collective farm movement.
The most important was the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU
(b) "On Measures for the elimination of the kulak farms in areas of
complete collectivization" of 30 January 1930, according to which areas
of complete collectivization had been scheduled: to confiscate from
Kulaks the means of production, cattle, small agricultural and
residential buildings, processing, feed and seed stocks. Kulaks in
their degrees of opposition to collectivization were divided into three
categories. Kulaks-active counter-revolutionaries were referred to
concentration camps, less dangerous kulaks - moved to the sparsely
populated regions. The total number of liquidated kulak households in
all major areas was estimated at roughly 3-5%. Lists of kulak
households being evicted to remote areas, were set up by regional
executive committees by decisions of meetings of farmers, laborers'
marginalised workers assemblies and approved by the district executive
committee. Strict orders were given - to concentrate blows against the
true kulak households and certainly to prevent the spread of these
measures to any part of the middle peasants.
The order stipulated: eviction and confiscation of property not to
include families of the Red Army and the commanders of the Red Army. It
was planned: to send 60 thousand kulaks to concentration camps and 150
thousand kulaks subjected to exile to remote areas. Family members of
prisoners and kulaks deported to concentration camps can, if they wish
and with the consent of the local executive committees, stay
temporarily or permanently at the former place of residence. The
resolution clearly stated, what should be left to the deported kulaks
from their property. When arriving at their new place of residence,
they are to be provided with building materials and discount loans for
renovation, to which the state has allocated tens of millions of
rubles. The Central Committee categorically stated: "These activities
must be in organic connection with the real mass collective movement of
the poor and middle peasants and an inseparable part of the process of
complete collectivisation. The Central Committee strongly cautioned
against the existing in some areas of facts of substituting work on
mass collectivization by de-kulakization. Only in combination with the
most extensive organization of the poorest peasants and agricultural
labourers and rallying the poor and middle peasants by
collectivization, and necessary administrative measures on
de-kulakization can lead to the successful resolution of the tasks set
by the party against in relation socialist reconstruction of the
countryside and the elimination of the kulaks. "
During the collectivization, the kulaks were expropriated in the same
way as in 1918 when the capitalists had been expropriated in the
industrial field, with one difference, however, that the means of
production of the kulaks crossed this time not into the hands of the
state, but into the hands of peasants united in the hands of the
collective farms. This was a profound revolution, a leap from the old
qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in
its consequences to the revolution in October 1917. The originality of
this revolution is that it was from above, on the initiative of the
state, with direct support from below from the vast masses of peasants
fighting against kulak bondage, for the freedom of the collective farms.
EXCESSES DURING THE COURSE OF COLLECTIVIZATION
The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on January 5,
1930 "On the tempo of collectivization and measures to help by the
state towards farm development" had made clear the implementation of
the new party policy in the countryside. On the basis of the policy of
eliminating the kulaks and the establishment of solid collectivization
a powerful collective movement was launched. Peasants of whole villages
and regions entered into collective farms and swept away the kulaks
from the path, and freed themselves from kulak bondage. But along with
the huge success of collectivization were soon detected shortcomings in
the practice of party workers and distortions of the Party policy on
collective farms. Despite the warning by the Central Committee against
excessive enthusiasm on the success of collectivization, many party
officials artificially forced collectivization, regardless of the
conditions of time and place, without regard to the degree of
preparedness of the peasants to join collective farms.
There were many violations and excesses. It was found that the
principle of voluntariness in collective farm construction was
violated. In some areas, voluntariness was replaced by forced joining
collective farms under the threat of de-kulakization, electoral
disenfranchisement, etc. There were rare cases in which peasants,
sometimes even - and the poor were improperly "catogorised" as kulaks.
Contrary to the instructions of the Central Committee that the basic
link of the collective farm movement was the agricultural cooperative,
which only the basic means of production are shared, in some places it
was carried out by a leap straight to the commune, along with the
socialization of dwellings, the subsistence and small-scale dairy
cattle, poultry and so on was conducted. All these excesses in
provocative aims were used by kulaks and their henchmen. Kulaks led
agitation for the slaughter before joining the collective farms,
assuring farmers that the farm animals "would be still taken away."
Kulaks themselves, by destroying and selling cattle, sought to "become
middle peasants." By March 1930,across the RSFSR, the number of pigs
decreased from the spring of 1929 by half, sheep â by a third, cattle -
a quarter, horses - by 12.5%. Kulaks widely used tactics of handing
their stocks of grain in interest-bearing debt to the poor and middle
peasants, and on inspection with "astonishment" claimed - we have no
surplus grain! The class enemy reckoned that the excesses and mistakes
made by local organizations during collectivization, would embitter the
peasantry, would cause revolts against Soviet power. And such
anti-Soviet action had taken place in the spring of 1930.
PUTTING RIGHT THE EXCESSES OF COLLECTIVISATION
The party Central Committee, having received a number of alarming
signals about the distortions of the Party line, which threatened the
collapse of collectivization, immediately began to rectify the
situation, began to turn the party cadres on the road to a speedy
correction of mistakes. On March 2, 1930 by decision of the Central
Committee article by Comrade Stalin "Dizzy with success. Questions on
the collective-farm movement. " was published . Stalin denounced the
actions of the authorities in the localities which were not included in
the accelerated plans for collectivization in particular, the premature
setting up of agricultural communes: "It is not the commune, but the
agricultural cooperative that is the main link of the collective farm
movement, the cooperatives are not socialized: i.e. peasant plots of
land (small gardens, orchards), dwellings, a certain part of the dairy
cattle, sheep, poultry and so on.â Stalin blamed "overzealous
socialiser" in "disrupting and discrediting" the collective farm
movement and condemned their actions, "pouring water into the watermill
of our class enemies."
The article by comrade Stalin had great political significance. It
helped the party organizations to rectify their mistakes and dealt a
severe blow to the enemies of Soviet power, their hope that on the soil
of the excesses, they would be able to set the peasants against the
Soviet power. The broad masses of peasants were convinced that the line
of the Bolshevik Party had nothing to do with the "left" excesses, that
were took place in the localities. The article brought comfort to the
peasant masses.
THE SUCCESS OF COLLECTIVISATION
By the opening of the XVI Congress on June 26, 1930, profound change in
the development of agriculture in the USSR had been achieved. The broad
masses of peasants had turned to socialism. On May 1, 1930 in the major
grain-growing regions, collectivization covered 40 - 50% of farms
(instead of 2-3% in the spring of 1928). Commodity production of
collective farms in three years had grown more than 40 times. Already
in 1930, the state received from the collective farms, excluding state
farms (the Sovkhoz), more than half of all marketable grain production
in the country. The collective-farm peasantry, as pointed out at the
XVI Congress of the Party in one of its decisions, "is a true and firm
support of Soviet power."
1931 gave a new growth of the collective farm movement. In the main
grain-growing districts, more than 80 percent of the total number of
peasant farms had been united into collective farms. Solid
collectivisation there was already largely completed. 200 thousand
collective farms (kolkhozy) and 4 thousand state farms (sovkhozy) had
seeded two-thirds of the total sowing area, but individual farmers -
only one-third.
THE STRUGGLE FOR QUALITY WORK OF COLLECTIVE FARMS
But collective farm construction has not yet been developed in depth,
but only in breadth - not through improving the quality of the
collective farms and their personnel, but by increasing the number of
collective farms and collective farms covering more and more new areas.
This circumstance is explained by the fact that the growth of the
collective assets, the growth of kolkhoz personnel was not keeping pace
with the quantitative growth of the collective farms. Hindering the
consolidation of collective were facts such as the lack of educated
people in the village needed to farm (accountants, office managers,
secretaries) and the lack of experience in conducting large-scale
collective farming. The collective farmers were the day before,
individual farmers. They had experience in farming small plots of land.
But they still did not have experience in leading large, collective
farms.
In view of these circumstances, were discovered serious flaws in the
early days of collective farming. It turned out that collective farm
labour was still poorly organized and labour discipline was weak. On
many collective farms, income ws not shared according to workdays, but
according to consumers. Often it appeared that a loafer got more bread
than a diligent, honest farmer. In connection with such deficiencies of
the collective leadership, interest of the farmers fell at work, there
was a lot of absenteeism, and even in the warmest season, part of the
collective farm crops remain unharvested until the snow and harvesting
itself was carried out carelessly leading to the huge losses of grain.
Lack of personal responsibility for machines and horses, the lack of
personal responsibility in work, weakened the collective cause and
reduced the income of the farms.
NEW TACTICS BY THE KULAKS. THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS UNDER MTS.
It was particularly bad in areas where former kulaks and pro-kulaks
managed to clamber into the collective farms and occupy certain posts.
Often, former kulaks moved to another district where they were not
known, and from there clamber into a collective farm to cause harm and
mischief. Penetration into collective farms by former kulaks was made
easier by the fact that in the struggle against the collective farms,
they abruptly changed their tactics. By now, they did not fire their
sawn-off shotguns, but pretended to be quiet, compliant, and obedient,
fully Soviet people. Penetrating into the collective farms, they tried
to break them from within, to break up the collective farm labour
discipline, messing up crop records and labour accounting. Kulaks were
betting on horse and livestock slaughter on the collective farms and
were able to kill a lot of horses. The kulaks damaged tractors and
machinery.
To put an end to the kulak sabotage on collective farms and to
accelerate the consolidation of farms, it was necessary to provide
collective emergency assistance and the serious help, advice and
guidance to people. This assistance was rendered to the collective
farms by the Bolshevik Party. In January 1933 the Party Central
Committee adopted a decision on the organization of political
departments in the machine-tractor stations, serving the collective
farms. 17 thousand party workers were sent to the countryside to work
in the political departments to help the collective farms. The
political departments of the MTS-s in two years (1933 and 1934) did
much work in addressing the shortcomings of the collective farms, to
grow the collective farm activists, to strengthen the collective farms,
to clean out collective farms from hostile, kulak, wrecking elements.
The political departments honorably fulfilled the stated objectives:
they strengthened the collective farms in organizational and economic
relations and educated new collective-farm staff, developed economic
management of collective farms and raised the political level of the
collective farm masses.
RESULTS OF COLLECTIVISATION
By the end of 1934, the collective farms had become a solid and
invincible force. They united by this time already about three-quarters
of all peasant farms throughout the Soviet Union and about 90 percent
of all farmland. In 1934, in Soviet agriculture 281 thousand tractors
and 32 thousand harvesters were working. A strong victory of the
collective farm system and associated development of agriculture gave
the Soviet government the chance to abolish the rationing of bread and
other products and to establish free trade in food products, to look to
the future with certainty.
A few words about the "remote" consequences of collectivization. Gross
output of a Soviet village as compared with 1913 for 60 years, for
example, grew 4,4 times, and productivity - 6 times. The USSR occupied
one of the first places in the world for food production: it produced
more wheat, rye, barley, sugar beets, potatoes and milk than any other
country in the world. In 1954-1961, the Soviet Union hd the world's
highest average annual growth rate of agricultural products â at 6%.
Compared with the record year of 1913, when it was produced 250 kg of
grain per capita, the USSR, increased these figures by 3 times.
THE VALUE COLLECTIVISATION
In summarizing, we can say - collectivization was absolutely necessary
and a vital stage of socialist construction in the USSR. Only by
completely destroying the power of capitalist owners in rural areas
could the people seriously aspire to build socialism in the USSR. Only
the care of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet government of the
peasant-workers allowed it to get out of the quagmire of centuries of
poverty and injustice, start a new life, where everything depended on
their honest, kind, conscientious labour.
How great is the role of Stalin personally in the planning and
implementation of collectivization. This was in the formulation of the
basic goals, objectives, pace, methods of collectivization, and the
wise leadership of this process at each stage, which allowed to avoid,
bypass time, many terrible dangers, standing in the way of
collectivization - the social process that vitally affects the fate of
tens of millions of people.
------------ --------- -------
(Translated by Kevin Cain, leader of For Bolshevism-AUCPB in the UK)
THE NEED FOR COLLECTIVISATION
Already by the end of 1927, the decisive success of the policy of
socialist industrialization was ascertained. In the sphere of industry,
the question "who is who" was a foregone conclusion in favour of
socialism. A different picture was presented by agriculture. Gross
output of its main sectors - grain production - amounted to only 91% of
the pre-war level, and the commodity side of grain products sold for
the supply of towns, barely reached 37% of the pre-war level, and all
evidence suggests that there was a danger of further decline of
commodity grain production. No doubt that if such a condition continued
in grain farming, the country would have found itself in the face of
chronic hunger.
The owner of the grain market was the kulak (wealthy peasant farmer).
Making up 2.5 -3% of the total number of farms, kulaks harvested 70-80%
of commodity grain. Poor farmers, who were horseless, were in complete
bondage to the kulak. For the use of a horse, a poor peasant had to
pay "either a pood of grain per day, or a woman harvesting for five
days." They were crippling terms, but what could they do? The harvest
of the poor peasant was not enough to last until the next year, and so
he had to borrow grain from the kulaks to the next harvest. He had to
return twice the amount of grain! The kulaks demanded from the state
complete freedom of trade in grain. The state price for grain did not
suit the kulak â so the kulak decided â âI will not sell the grain, but
will dig it into a pit, and let it rot. And it was a mass phenomenon.
For concealment of grain in 1928, for example, in the Middle Volga
Region, 17 thousand kulak farms were put on trial.
WAYS OUT OF THE CRISIS
To get out of the crisis situation, it was necessary to transfer
agriculture over to large-scale production that can set in motion,
tractors and agricultural machinery and to raise several times the
marketability of grain production. The country faced two options:
either to move to large-scale capitalist production, which would mean
the ruin of the peasant masses, the loss of alliance between the
working class and peasants, a strengthening of the kulaks and the
defeat of socialism in the countryside, or take the path of
consolidation of small farms into large socialist farms, i.e.
collective farms.
It is clear that the Bolshevik Party and Soviet state could only take
the second road, the collective farm pathway of agricultural
development. This is what Lenin said: "Only if we succeed in practice
to show peasants the benefits of public, collective, cooperative
cultivation, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of a
cooperative, collective farm economy, will the working class, which
holds state power in its own hands, and the peasants actually prove
their case, and really attract over to its side firmly in this way,
millions of peasants.
XV CONGRESS. COLLECTIVIZATION. THE KULAK.
Such was the situation before the XV Congress of the Party opened on
December 2, 1927. Noting in his Report to Congress on the progress of
industrialization and the rapid growth of socialist industry, Stalin
put to the Party the task: "To expand and strengthen our socialist
commanding heights in all sectors of the economy both in the city and
village, heading towards the liquidation of capitalist elements in the
national economy. Noting the backwardness of agriculture, especially
grain production, comrade Stalin emphasized that such an unenviable
state of agriculture was posing a threat to the entire economy.
"The way out, - answered comrade Stalin â is to turn the small and
scattered peasant farms into large integrated ones based on social
cultivation of land, in the transition to collective farming on the
basis of new and higher technology. The way out is for the small and
tiny peasant farms to gradually but steadily, not by pressure, but by
example and persuasion, merge into large farms based on public,
cooperative, collective farming, with the use of agricultural machinery
and tractors, using scientific methods of intensive farming.â
The XV Congress decided on the full deployment of collectivization of
agriculture. The Congress adopted a plan for expanding and
strengthening the network of collective and state farms, and gave clear
instructions on how to fight for collectivization of agriculture. The
Party realized that, until the resistance of the kulaks was broken, and
until kulakism was smashed in open battle in front of the peasantry,
the working class and the Red Army will suffer from a shortage of
bread, and the collective movement of peasants can not take a mass
character.
Following the directives of the XV Congress of the Party, the party
launched a determined offensive against the kulaks. In its advance
forward, the party carried the slogan: reliance on the poor peasant and
strengthening the alliance with the middle peasant, carry out a
resolute struggle against the kulaks. In response to the refusal by the
kulaks to sell surplus grain to the state at a fixed price, the party
and the government carried out a series of emergency measures against
the kulaks, applied Article 107 of the Criminal Code on confiscation by
the court of surplus grain from the kulaks and speculators if they
refuse to sell this surplus grain to the state at fixed prices.
KULAK TERROR
The kulaks immediately realized the mortal danger to themselves by
collectivization and unleashed terror against the collective farm
activists and village correspondents. Not a week went by that the
newspapers did not report killings of village correspondents carried
out by kulaks. In the village of Molvino in Bogorodsky district, of the
Moscow province, an active rural correspondent of the county
newspaper "Voice of the working" and secretary Zakharov of the Komsomol
cell were shot and killed from behind a corner. In the village of Sabah
(Tatar Republic), kulaks brutally murdered active worker rural
correspondent Zakir Yusupov, who was exposing the tricks of the kulaks
in the newspapers. In Crimea, in the village Mushasha, kulaks killed
labourer-Komsomol Alexeyev, an organizer of the rural wall newspaper.
In Uzbekistan, Bai mercenaries slaughtered active worker comrade
Shukurov and his wife. The Orshansky district court sentenced to five
years in prison four kulaks from the village Lozovka in Krupsky
district for arson of the new farm "Iskra" and the destruction of nine
collective farm workers. Of interest are available a summary of
information of the hostile acts carried out against the collective
farms in the first half of 1931. In general, across the Soviet Union
during this period were attacked once - 8.1% percent of collective
farms, two times - 3.4%, three times - 1.4%, four times or more - 2.9%
of farms. Out of one hundred cases of attack, 21.9% were arson attacks,
poisoning of cattle - 7.4%, attacks on activists - 35.1% of cases,
damage to the collective farm machinery â 14.5% and others - 20.7% of
cases.
TURNING TO COLLECTIVE FARMS
The actual attitude by the mass of the peasants - poor, middle peasants
toward collectivization after the XV Congress of the Party had changed.
The peasant masses were definitely turning towards collective farms. An
important role was played by state and Machine-Tractor Stations, armed
with tractors and other machines. Creating MTS-s was fully supported by
Stalin in his speech at the XV Congress, where he quoted a letter from
Odessa peasants: "After seeing the work of the tractors, we do not want
poor small-scale farming, and have decided to organize a tractorized
socialized economy in which there will be none of the peasant patches
of crops. The organizing of tractor farms for us has already been taken
on by the Taras Shevchenko farm, with whom we made agreementâ. On June
5, 1929, the Labor and Defense Council adopted a resolution on the
widespread establishment of MTS-s. It was a wise decision, which made
it possible to unload from the emerging collective farms the unbearable
burden of buying expensive agricultural technology, by providing for
high-quality maintenance and repair. The role of the MTS in raising the
level of Soviet agriculture was enormous. MTS-s lasted until 1958, when
Khrushchev had them liquidated. As has been written on the
Internet: "At the present time, due to the difficult financial
situation of many agricultural enterprises, as well as the development
of small farms, the need to form MTS-s has re-emerged!â
A country rhyme during the time of collectivization clearly shows the
position of poor peasants:
You kulak -
Enemy of the Soviet,
Who buries bread in the ravine, -
You will not bring back the days bygone,
Shall not lead the country to darkness.
A mass collective-farm movement unfolded, which especially gained
strength by the end of 1929, and gave unprecedented growth of the
collective farms. In 1928, the sown area of farms was 1,390 thousand
hectares in 1929 - 4,262 thousand hectares, and in 1930 the collective
farms had sown 15 million hectares. In his article "A Year of Great
Change" (November 7, 1929) Comrade Stalin said, "It must be admitted
that the rate of growth of the collective farms - is such speedy pace
of development unprecedented even by our socialized large-scale
industry, the pace of development is altogether on a grander scale." It
was a turning point in the development of the collective movement. This
was the beginning of a mass collective-farm movement. "What is new in
the current collective-farm movement?", asked Comrade. Stalin. And he
answered: "The new and decisive in the current collective-farm movement
is that the collective peasants are not in separate groups, as was the
case earlier, but entire villages, parishes, districts, and even
okrugs. And what does this mean? This means that the middle peasant has
gone into collective farms. This is the basis of that radical change in
the development of agriculture, which is a major achievement of Soviet
power ...â.
This meant that the task of eliminating the kulaks as a class, on the
basis of complete collectivisation was ripening or had ripened. The
massive entry of peasants into collective farms that unfolded in 1929 -
1930 respectively, was the result of all the previous work of the Party
and government. The growth of socialist industry, which began mass
production of tractors and agricultural machinery; the resolute
struggle against the kulaks during the grain-procurement campaigns in
1928 and 1929; a good experience of the first collective and state
farms - all this prepared for the transition to solid collectivization,
the entry of peasants into collective farms of whole villages, regions,
districts.
ELIMINATION OF KULAKS AS A CLASS.
Until 1929 the Soviet government pursued a policy of restricting the
kulaks. Soviet power heavily taxed the kulaks, demanded that he sell
grain to the state at fixed prices, limited to a certain size the
kulak's land use by the law on land lease and limited the scope of
kulak farming by a law on the use of hired labor on private farms.
At the end of 1929, in connection with the growth of collective and
state farms, the Soviet government made a sharp turn in relation to the
kulak. On January 19, 1930, Stalin wrote an article "On the question of
eliminating the kulaks as a class," which clearly and unequivocally
said: "The current policy of the party in the countryside is not a
continuation of the old policy, but a change from the old policy of
restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the village to a
new policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. "
This policy was embodied in the decree of the Central Committee of the
CPSU (b) on January 5, 1930 "On the speed of collectivization and
measures by the state to help farm development" . The decision made
important instructions that the main form of farm movement at this
stage was the agricultural cooperative, in which only the basic means
of production was collectivized. The Central Committee seriously warned
against any party organizations whatsoever, "decreeing" from above and
over the collective farm movement.
The most important was the decision of the Politburo of the CPSU
(b) "On Measures for the elimination of the kulak farms in areas of
complete collectivization" of 30 January 1930, according to which areas
of complete collectivization had been scheduled: to confiscate from
Kulaks the means of production, cattle, small agricultural and
residential buildings, processing, feed and seed stocks. Kulaks in
their degrees of opposition to collectivization were divided into three
categories. Kulaks-active counter-revolutionaries were referred to
concentration camps, less dangerous kulaks - moved to the sparsely
populated regions. The total number of liquidated kulak households in
all major areas was estimated at roughly 3-5%. Lists of kulak
households being evicted to remote areas, were set up by regional
executive committees by decisions of meetings of farmers, laborers'
marginalised workers assemblies and approved by the district executive
committee. Strict orders were given - to concentrate blows against the
true kulak households and certainly to prevent the spread of these
measures to any part of the middle peasants.
The order stipulated: eviction and confiscation of property not to
include families of the Red Army and the commanders of the Red Army. It
was planned: to send 60 thousand kulaks to concentration camps and 150
thousand kulaks subjected to exile to remote areas. Family members of
prisoners and kulaks deported to concentration camps can, if they wish
and with the consent of the local executive committees, stay
temporarily or permanently at the former place of residence. The
resolution clearly stated, what should be left to the deported kulaks
from their property. When arriving at their new place of residence,
they are to be provided with building materials and discount loans for
renovation, to which the state has allocated tens of millions of
rubles. The Central Committee categorically stated: "These activities
must be in organic connection with the real mass collective movement of
the poor and middle peasants and an inseparable part of the process of
complete collectivisation. The Central Committee strongly cautioned
against the existing in some areas of facts of substituting work on
mass collectivization by de-kulakization. Only in combination with the
most extensive organization of the poorest peasants and agricultural
labourers and rallying the poor and middle peasants by
collectivization, and necessary administrative measures on
de-kulakization can lead to the successful resolution of the tasks set
by the party against in relation socialist reconstruction of the
countryside and the elimination of the kulaks. "
During the collectivization, the kulaks were expropriated in the same
way as in 1918 when the capitalists had been expropriated in the
industrial field, with one difference, however, that the means of
production of the kulaks crossed this time not into the hands of the
state, but into the hands of peasants united in the hands of the
collective farms. This was a profound revolution, a leap from the old
qualitative state of society to a new qualitative state, equivalent in
its consequences to the revolution in October 1917. The originality of
this revolution is that it was from above, on the initiative of the
state, with direct support from below from the vast masses of peasants
fighting against kulak bondage, for the freedom of the collective farms.
EXCESSES DURING THE COURSE OF COLLECTIVIZATION
The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b) on January 5,
1930 "On the tempo of collectivization and measures to help by the
state towards farm development" had made clear the implementation of
the new party policy in the countryside. On the basis of the policy of
eliminating the kulaks and the establishment of solid collectivization
a powerful collective movement was launched. Peasants of whole villages
and regions entered into collective farms and swept away the kulaks
from the path, and freed themselves from kulak bondage. But along with
the huge success of collectivization were soon detected shortcomings in
the practice of party workers and distortions of the Party policy on
collective farms. Despite the warning by the Central Committee against
excessive enthusiasm on the success of collectivization, many party
officials artificially forced collectivization, regardless of the
conditions of time and place, without regard to the degree of
preparedness of the peasants to join collective farms.
There were many violations and excesses. It was found that the
principle of voluntariness in collective farm construction was
violated. In some areas, voluntariness was replaced by forced joining
collective farms under the threat of de-kulakization, electoral
disenfranchisement, etc. There were rare cases in which peasants,
sometimes even - and the poor were improperly "catogorised" as kulaks.
Contrary to the instructions of the Central Committee that the basic
link of the collective farm movement was the agricultural cooperative,
which only the basic means of production are shared, in some places it
was carried out by a leap straight to the commune, along with the
socialization of dwellings, the subsistence and small-scale dairy
cattle, poultry and so on was conducted. All these excesses in
provocative aims were used by kulaks and their henchmen. Kulaks led
agitation for the slaughter before joining the collective farms,
assuring farmers that the farm animals "would be still taken away."
Kulaks themselves, by destroying and selling cattle, sought to "become
middle peasants." By March 1930,across the RSFSR, the number of pigs
decreased from the spring of 1929 by half, sheep â by a third, cattle -
a quarter, horses - by 12.5%. Kulaks widely used tactics of handing
their stocks of grain in interest-bearing debt to the poor and middle
peasants, and on inspection with "astonishment" claimed - we have no
surplus grain! The class enemy reckoned that the excesses and mistakes
made by local organizations during collectivization, would embitter the
peasantry, would cause revolts against Soviet power. And such
anti-Soviet action had taken place in the spring of 1930.
PUTTING RIGHT THE EXCESSES OF COLLECTIVISATION
The party Central Committee, having received a number of alarming
signals about the distortions of the Party line, which threatened the
collapse of collectivization, immediately began to rectify the
situation, began to turn the party cadres on the road to a speedy
correction of mistakes. On March 2, 1930 by decision of the Central
Committee article by Comrade Stalin "Dizzy with success. Questions on
the collective-farm movement. " was published . Stalin denounced the
actions of the authorities in the localities which were not included in
the accelerated plans for collectivization in particular, the premature
setting up of agricultural communes: "It is not the commune, but the
agricultural cooperative that is the main link of the collective farm
movement, the cooperatives are not socialized: i.e. peasant plots of
land (small gardens, orchards), dwellings, a certain part of the dairy
cattle, sheep, poultry and so on.â Stalin blamed "overzealous
socialiser" in "disrupting and discrediting" the collective farm
movement and condemned their actions, "pouring water into the watermill
of our class enemies."
The article by comrade Stalin had great political significance. It
helped the party organizations to rectify their mistakes and dealt a
severe blow to the enemies of Soviet power, their hope that on the soil
of the excesses, they would be able to set the peasants against the
Soviet power. The broad masses of peasants were convinced that the line
of the Bolshevik Party had nothing to do with the "left" excesses, that
were took place in the localities. The article brought comfort to the
peasant masses.
THE SUCCESS OF COLLECTIVISATION
By the opening of the XVI Congress on June 26, 1930, profound change in
the development of agriculture in the USSR had been achieved. The broad
masses of peasants had turned to socialism. On May 1, 1930 in the major
grain-growing regions, collectivization covered 40 - 50% of farms
(instead of 2-3% in the spring of 1928). Commodity production of
collective farms in three years had grown more than 40 times. Already
in 1930, the state received from the collective farms, excluding state
farms (the Sovkhoz), more than half of all marketable grain production
in the country. The collective-farm peasantry, as pointed out at the
XVI Congress of the Party in one of its decisions, "is a true and firm
support of Soviet power."
1931 gave a new growth of the collective farm movement. In the main
grain-growing districts, more than 80 percent of the total number of
peasant farms had been united into collective farms. Solid
collectivisation there was already largely completed. 200 thousand
collective farms (kolkhozy) and 4 thousand state farms (sovkhozy) had
seeded two-thirds of the total sowing area, but individual farmers -
only one-third.
THE STRUGGLE FOR QUALITY WORK OF COLLECTIVE FARMS
But collective farm construction has not yet been developed in depth,
but only in breadth - not through improving the quality of the
collective farms and their personnel, but by increasing the number of
collective farms and collective farms covering more and more new areas.
This circumstance is explained by the fact that the growth of the
collective assets, the growth of kolkhoz personnel was not keeping pace
with the quantitative growth of the collective farms. Hindering the
consolidation of collective were facts such as the lack of educated
people in the village needed to farm (accountants, office managers,
secretaries) and the lack of experience in conducting large-scale
collective farming. The collective farmers were the day before,
individual farmers. They had experience in farming small plots of land.
But they still did not have experience in leading large, collective
farms.
In view of these circumstances, were discovered serious flaws in the
early days of collective farming. It turned out that collective farm
labour was still poorly organized and labour discipline was weak. On
many collective farms, income ws not shared according to workdays, but
according to consumers. Often it appeared that a loafer got more bread
than a diligent, honest farmer. In connection with such deficiencies of
the collective leadership, interest of the farmers fell at work, there
was a lot of absenteeism, and even in the warmest season, part of the
collective farm crops remain unharvested until the snow and harvesting
itself was carried out carelessly leading to the huge losses of grain.
Lack of personal responsibility for machines and horses, the lack of
personal responsibility in work, weakened the collective cause and
reduced the income of the farms.
NEW TACTICS BY THE KULAKS. THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS UNDER MTS.
It was particularly bad in areas where former kulaks and pro-kulaks
managed to clamber into the collective farms and occupy certain posts.
Often, former kulaks moved to another district where they were not
known, and from there clamber into a collective farm to cause harm and
mischief. Penetration into collective farms by former kulaks was made
easier by the fact that in the struggle against the collective farms,
they abruptly changed their tactics. By now, they did not fire their
sawn-off shotguns, but pretended to be quiet, compliant, and obedient,
fully Soviet people. Penetrating into the collective farms, they tried
to break them from within, to break up the collective farm labour
discipline, messing up crop records and labour accounting. Kulaks were
betting on horse and livestock slaughter on the collective farms and
were able to kill a lot of horses. The kulaks damaged tractors and
machinery.
To put an end to the kulak sabotage on collective farms and to
accelerate the consolidation of farms, it was necessary to provide
collective emergency assistance and the serious help, advice and
guidance to people. This assistance was rendered to the collective
farms by the Bolshevik Party. In January 1933 the Party Central
Committee adopted a decision on the organization of political
departments in the machine-tractor stations, serving the collective
farms. 17 thousand party workers were sent to the countryside to work
in the political departments to help the collective farms. The
political departments of the MTS-s in two years (1933 and 1934) did
much work in addressing the shortcomings of the collective farms, to
grow the collective farm activists, to strengthen the collective farms,
to clean out collective farms from hostile, kulak, wrecking elements.
The political departments honorably fulfilled the stated objectives:
they strengthened the collective farms in organizational and economic
relations and educated new collective-farm staff, developed economic
management of collective farms and raised the political level of the
collective farm masses.
RESULTS OF COLLECTIVISATION
By the end of 1934, the collective farms had become a solid and
invincible force. They united by this time already about three-quarters
of all peasant farms throughout the Soviet Union and about 90 percent
of all farmland. In 1934, in Soviet agriculture 281 thousand tractors
and 32 thousand harvesters were working. A strong victory of the
collective farm system and associated development of agriculture gave
the Soviet government the chance to abolish the rationing of bread and
other products and to establish free trade in food products, to look to
the future with certainty.
A few words about the "remote" consequences of collectivization. Gross
output of a Soviet village as compared with 1913 for 60 years, for
example, grew 4,4 times, and productivity - 6 times. The USSR occupied
one of the first places in the world for food production: it produced
more wheat, rye, barley, sugar beets, potatoes and milk than any other
country in the world. In 1954-1961, the Soviet Union hd the world's
highest average annual growth rate of agricultural products â at 6%.
Compared with the record year of 1913, when it was produced 250 kg of
grain per capita, the USSR, increased these figures by 3 times.
THE VALUE COLLECTIVISATION
In summarizing, we can say - collectivization was absolutely necessary
and a vital stage of socialist construction in the USSR. Only by
completely destroying the power of capitalist owners in rural areas
could the people seriously aspire to build socialism in the USSR. Only
the care of the Bolshevik Party, the Soviet government of the
peasant-workers allowed it to get out of the quagmire of centuries of
poverty and injustice, start a new life, where everything depended on
their honest, kind, conscientious labour.
How great is the role of Stalin personally in the planning and
implementation of collectivization. This was in the formulation of the
basic goals, objectives, pace, methods of collectivization, and the
wise leadership of this process at each stage, which allowed to avoid,
bypass time, many terrible dangers, standing in the way of
collectivization - the social process that vitally affects the fate of
tens of millions of people.
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